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ONCE MORE INTO THE MIRE, DEAR FRIENDS:  DETERMINING THE 
EXISTENCE OF A DUTY OF CARE IN NEGLIGENCE 
 
Dr Des Butler

 
 
 
There were signs in the 1997 High Court decision in Hill v Van Erp
1
 that the different 
members of the bench were beginning to move in the same direction when it came to the 
tort equivalent of the search for the Holy Grail, a common approach to the determination of 
the existence of a duty of care in negligence.  The case was the first following the 
retirement of Mason CJ and Deane J, who were the two leading proponents of the notion of 
proximity as a unifying theme in the determination of duty.
2
  Indeed, the High Court under 
the direction of Mason CJ and Deane J found a versatility in proximity that had hitherto 
gone unrecognised, including being utilised, in the appropriate case, to deny the existence 
of a duty,
3
 set the appropriate standard of care,
4
 and determine the nature of the duty of 
care.
5
   In Hill v Van Erp the concept of proximity as championed by Mason CJ and Deane 
J was laid to rest,6 although some of the judges saw a continued utility in the term 
“proximity” as a label to describe those factors additional to reasonable foreseeability 
which were required as pre-conditions for the recognition of a duty of care in particular 
cases.7  The judgments in Hill v Van Erp also generally continued a trend commenced in 
                                               
  LLB (Hons), PhD. Assistant Dean, Research, Faculty of Law, Queensland 
University of Technology.  Member of Centre for Commercial and Property Law.  
1  (1997) 188 CLR 159. 
2  See, eg, Burnie Port Authority v. General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520. 
3  Gala v Preston (1991) 172 CLR 243. 
4  Cook v Cook (1986) 162 CLR 376. 
5  Burnie Port Authority v. General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520. 
6  See, eg, Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159 at 177-178 per Dawson J, 189 per 
Toohey J, 210-213 per McHugh J, 237 per Gummow J.  Even Gaudron J, the last 
proponent of proximity as a unifying theme, has now finally abandoned the 
theory: see, eg, Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1195. 
7  See, eg, Dawson J at 177-178,  Toohey J at 189. 
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Bryan v Maloney8 of the High Court examining the policy considerations relevant in 
particular circumstances in a more overt fashion. 
 
In the cases following Hill v Van Erp,9 which have involved a bench much reconstituted 
from the days when the unifying rationale concept of proximity held sway, the members of 
the High Court have had limited opportunities to express views in relation to the approach 
that should be adopted by an Australian court when confronted by a claim of a duty 
existing in a novel situation. An exception was Kirby J, who in Pyrenees Shire Council v 
Day10 signalled his support for the three-stage approach stated by Lord Bridge in Caparo 
Industries Plc v Dickman.11  The recent case of Perre v Apand Ltd,12 however, presented a 
sufficiently novel case to allow an examination of the general question of how a court 
should determine the existence of a duty of care.  Unfortunately, any hopes for those at the 
coal face – trial judges, legal advisers and litigants – that Hill v Van Erp had signalled the 
development of a uniform approach to duty were dispelled by the seven members pursuing 
at least five different approaches to the case. 
 
2. Perre v Apand: the facts 
 
In Perre v Apand the plaintiffs grew potatoes on their South Australian property for export 
to Western Australia.  The plaintiffs’ involvement was actually part of a complicated 
integrated commercial operation including roles such as grower, packager and landowner 
for other tenants who grew potatoes.  The defendants were involved in the Australian 
potato crisping industry and had numerous contracts for the supply of potatoes with 
growers.  The defendant conducted trials of different potato seed in a number of states in 
order to assess their suitability as a winter crop and for crisping.  One such trial was 
conducted on a property adjacent to that of the plaintiffs.  Subsequently bacterial wilt was 
discovered on that property, but not on the plaintiffs’ property.  Nevertheless, due to State 
                                               
8  (1995) 182 CLR 609. 
9  See, eg, Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 
188 CLR 241; Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330. 
10  (1998) 192 CLR 330 at 419-420. 
11  [1990] 2 AC 605. 
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regulation no potatoes within a 20km radius of bacterial wilt could be exported to Western 
Australia.  This included potatoes grown on the plaintiffs’ property.  The plaintiffs 
therefore suffered economic loss in their various capacities in connection with the loss of 
the opportunity to export potatoes to Western Australia. 
 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had a duty to prevent their economic 
loss in circumstances where the plaintiff knew of: (1) the risks associated with bacterial 
wilt; (2) the vulnerability of potato growers to the effect of the disease; and (3) that the 
West Australian market was lucrative for South Australian potato growers.  The defendant 
argued that no duty was owed due to principally  two policy grounds: 
 
 it would amount to the imposition of liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class;
13
 and 
 in a competitive commercial environment, a duty to take reasonable care to avoid 
causing  any economic loss to another may be inconsistent with community standards 
in relation to conduct which is ordinarily legitimate in the pursuit of personal 
advantage. 
 
The High Court ultimately held that the defendant was liable, although the judges differed 
in the routes they took to arrive at this conclusion. 
 
3. Approaches to duty 
 
The different approaches to determining the existence of a duty of care in the present case 
were as follows: 
 
3.1 Protected interests and salient features (Gleeson CJ/Gummow J) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
12  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190. 
13  Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609 at 618 citing Ultramares Corporation v 
Touche 174 NE 441 at 444 (1931). 
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Gummow J, with whom Gleeson CJ concurred regarding the appropriate approach to duty, 
saw value in the suggestion by McPherson JA in the Queensland case Christopher v Motor 
Vessel “Fiji” Gas14 that the common law tended, when attempting to define the limits of 
liability for economic loss, to concentrate upon the actions of the defendant.  Instead it 
should first identify those interests which are sufficient to attract the protection of the law 
in this field.15   Here they comprised economic loss in the form of a loss of export sales, 
expenses in mitigating that loss, loss of a tenant, and a decreased value of the plaintiffs’ 
land.   Interests of this nature were susceptible of protection by the law of negligence 
against injury albeit they were economic in nature.  Such injury was recognised as a kind of 
detriment which, if negligently caused, may attract compensation.16 
 
Gummow J did not see the development of new precedent as a matter of incrementalism or 
argument by analogy from decided cases.17  Such an approach has been criticised on the 
basis that it “suffers from a temporal defect – that rights should be determined by the 
accident of birth”.18   
 
Instead, he preferred the approach taken by Stephens J in Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v 
The Dredge Willemstad, that is to identify the “salient” features” which combined to 
constitute a sufficiently close relationship to give rise to a duty of care.  The combination of 
salient features in this case – the defendant’s exclusive control of the nature and location of 
the experiment;19 the plaintiffs’ inability to either appreciate the risk they had been exposed 
                                                                                                                                            
 
14  [1993] Aust Torts Rep 81-202 at 61,967. 
15  Cf the concept of “legally recognised rights” advocated by Gaudron J, discussed 
below. 
16  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1226. 
17  Cf the incremental approach supported by at least McHugh and Hayne JJ, 
discussed below. 
18  Ward v McMaster [1998] IR 337 at 347 per McCarthy J (Irish Sup Ct). 
19  This measure of control was in Gummow J’s view at least as great as that of the 
Shire in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330 where a duty was 
recognised. 
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to or to take steps protect themselves from that risk;
20
 and the effect of the Western 
Australian legislation being such that within the 20 km buffer zone the economic loss 
would flow directly and inevitably and the possibility of occurrence would not be 
speculative – was such as to bring the plaintiffs and the defendant into such close and direct 
relations as to give rise to a duty of care owed by defendant.21 
 
3.2 Recognised legal rights (Gaudron J) 
 
Gaudron J noted that Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd22 and subsequent 
cases constituted a category of case involving pure economic loss resulting from negligent 
misstatement.  She then reiterated a statement she had made in Hawkins v Clayton in which 
she noted that:  
 
The law of tort already protects contractual rights from intentional interference … 
[and the] torts of trespass, conversion, detinue and slander of title are intimately 
concerned with the protection of legal rights.23 
 
On this basis, she proposed that there was a second category of recovery for pure economic 
loss suffered in consequence of loss or impairment of a legal right.24  She stated the 
proposition more fully in the following terms: 
 
Where a person knows or ought to know that his or her acts or omissions may cause 
the loss or impairment of legal rights possessed, enjoyed or exercised by another, 
whether as an individual or as a member of a class, and that that latter person is in 
no position to protect his or her own interests, there is a relationship such that the 
law should impose a duty of care on the former to take reasonable steps to avoid a 
                                               
20  Gummow J contrasted the position of the financier in Esanda Finance 
Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241 at 266, 248-5, 
304  where a duty was denied. 
21  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1230-1231. 
22  [1964] AC 465. 
23  (1988) 164 CLR 539 at 594. 
24  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1196. 
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foreseeable risk of economic loss resulting from loss or impairment of those 
rights.25 
  
Her Honour saw this approach as being capable of providing a common thread running 
through a number of recent decisions by the High Court: Bennett v Minister of 
Community Welfare26 could be seen as involving impairment of a right to bring an action 
for damages for personal injury; Hawkins v Clayton27 could be seen as involving 
impairment of the legal right of a named executor to obtain probate of a will; and Hill v 
Van Erp28 may be seen as involving impairment of the right a beneficiary to receive a 
testamentary gift intended by a testatrix. 
 
In the case at hand, her Honour found a duty established by virtue of the defendant 
knowing that the experiment it was conducting on the property adjacent to that owned by 
the plaintiffs may cause the loss or impairment of the legal rights enjoyed by the 
plaintiffs by virtue of the statutory ban of the export of their crop to Western Australia, 
combined with the inability of the plaintiffs to do anything to protect their interests. 
 
3.3 Three-stage Caparo approach (Kirby J) 
 
Kirby J repeated the view that he expressed in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day
29
 that the 
appropriate response to determination of duty involved three questions: 
 
1. Was it reasonably foreseeable to the alleged wrongdoer that particular conduct or 
an omission on its part would be likely to cause harm to persons who have suffered 
damage or a person in the same position? 
2. Does there exist between the alleged wrongdoer and such a person a relationship 
characterised by the law as one of “proximity” or “neighbourhood”? 
                                               
25  Ibid, at 1198. 
26  (1982) 176 CLR 408. 
27  (1988) 164 CLR 539. 
28  (1997) 188 CLR 159. 
29  (1998) 192 CLR 330 at 419-420. 
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3. If so, is it fair, just and reasonable that the law should impose a duty of the given 
scope upon the alleged wrongdoer for the benefit of such a person?30 
 
Kirby J acknowledged, as Lord Bridges did in Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman31 when he 
first formulated the three-stage approach, that terms such as “proximity,” “neighbourhood” 
and “fair, just and reasonable” were merely labels and not precise tests.  “Negligence” itself 
was a “label” – as were so-called criteria or “principles” of determinacy of liability, 
vulnerability to risk, autonomy of the individual, economic competitiveness and 
predictability of outcome.  Labels are commonly used by lawyers: they help steer them 
through the task in hand.32  The value of the approach therefore lay in returning legal 
liability for pure economic loss to a conceptual framework common to all other actions 
expressed in terms of the tort of negligence.33  The different stages merely directed the 
mind to the particular questions which needed to be addressed when coming to a 
conclusion in a particular case.   
 
It was therefore a matter of the level of abstraction with which the concepts are to be stated 
for legal purposes.  For example, considerations of indeterminacy and liability, 
vulnerability to risk, the autonomy of the individual and market competitiveness are not 
issues relevant to all negligence actions, or even all negligence actions involving pure 
economic loss independent of physical injury to the plaintiff’s property or person.  It was 
therefore quite inappropriate to elevate them so that they become legal preconditions to the 
existence of a duty of care in negligence or “principles” to be applied in deciding whether 
the duty exists in a particular case. However, conceptually they all belonged to the 
evaluation of considerations of policy.34  
 
                                               
30  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1240. 
31  [1990] 2 AC 605. 
32  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1245. 
33  Ibid. 
34  Ibid, at 1246. 
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After noting the history of unsuccessful attempts to identify a single approach to 
determining the existence of a duty of care, his Honour proposed that the Court’s task was 
as follows: 
 
This Court’s duty is not to search for more “rules” which will last a moment but fail 
to afford more than fleeting and particular guidance as new and different 
circumstances present themselves for decision.  Our duty is to afford an approach in 
methodology which is universal to the tort of negligence and appropriate to the 
particular sub-category of negligence where the breach in question has occasioned 
pure economic loss.  Only the Caparo formulation achieves that goal.  We should 
adopt it.35 
 
In supporting this approach, Kirby J was of the view that it would bring Australia in line 
with an approach already followed in England,36 New Zealand37 and Canada.38 
 
Accordingly, his Honour held that a duty was owed by the defendant since: 
 
 it was beyond serious argument in this case that damage to the Perre interests of the 
type that occurred was or ought reasonably to have been foreseen by Apand.: the 
risk was real and not merely fanciful; 
 the parties were in a relationship of proximity or neighbourhood because potato 
farmers within the 20 km radius were in a position of vulnerability arising from an 
almost contiguous physical propinquity to a farm to which the defendant decided to 
introduce an uncertified seed.   
                                               
35  Ibid. 
36  See, eg, Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296 at 326 per Lord 
Lowry, 336 per Lord Slynn; X (minus) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 
AC 633 at 739; Connolly-Martin v Davis [1999] TLR 431. 
37  See, eg, South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v New Zealand Security Consultants 
& Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282; Invercargill City Council v Hamlin 
[1994] 3 NZLR 513. 
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 in relation to the two policy grounds argued by the defendant, while imposing legal 
liability upon an indeterminate class for indeterminate amounts was a legitimate and 
justifiable concern, it did not apply here because those affected within a 20 km 
radius formed a finite class of claimant. Nor would recognising a legal duty of care 
interfere unreasonably with the defendant’s economic freedom and autonomy or the 
competitive operation of the market place because the defendant was not entitled to 
pursue its economic interests in a way that constituted breach of the law, which it 
had done by illegally importing seed affected by bacterial wilt into the state.39 
 
3.4 Incrementalism (McHugh and Hayne JJ) 
 
McHugh J criticised both an approach based on legally recognised interests (as advocated 
by Gaudron J) and the Caparo three stage approach (as supported by Kirby J). 
 
As to the former, McHugh J expressed concern regarding how “precise legal right” was to 
be defined: it was one thing if it meant only proprietary, equitable and contractual rights.  
However, he perceived the suggestion by Gaudron J to mean that it included a right in the 
sense of the extension of the private law closure rule – in other words, that anything which 
was not prohibited is permitted and therefore a “right.”  He feared that to impose duties of 
care in such situations would extend the liability of defendants, perhaps massively.40 
 
As to the latter, his Honour saw the approach as suffering at least three defects: 
 
 the second stage “proximity” had no more content than it did when it was being 
used as a unifying criterion, which was recognised by Lord Bridge himself in 
Caparo v Dickman Industries plc.  If the meaning of proximity is restricted to 
nearness or closeness, neither logic nor policy requires that it should always be 
                                                                                                                                            
38  See, eg, Norsk and Hercules Management Ltd  v Ernst & Young [1997] 2 SCR 
165; Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd v Saint John Ship Building Ltd [1997] 3 
SCR 1210. 
39  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1246-1249. 
40  Ibid, at 1203-1204. 
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elevated above other factors that are relevant in a particular case.  Furthermore, 
proximity in the sense of nearness or closeness is hardly a useful concept in most 
cases of pure economic loss; 
 there was a danger that the Caparo test will be used as a test of duty in every case 
where duty is an issue.  That would deny the operation of the established categories 
and the certainty that they provide.  Even in its zenith proximity was a rationale to 
be applied in aid of the principled development of new categories.  It was not meant 
to “invade” the existing categories and wreak havoc with the accepted and 
unproblematic principles developed within those categories; and 
 while concepts of fairness and justice may be attractive to appellate courts, law 
reform commissions, the academy and among legislators, in many cases they are 
of little, if any, use to the practitioners and trial judges who must apply the law to 
concrete facts arising from real life activities.41  
 
Further,  McHugh J was of the view that when criteria were formulated according to what 
was “fair,” “just,” “just and equitable” or “unconscionable,” they inevitably extended the 
range of admissible evidentiary materials.  Consequently, cases took longer and were 
more expensive to try, and due to the indeterminacy of such terms settlement of cases 
was more difficult with practitioners often having widely different views as to the result 
of cases.42 
 
Instead, his Honour saw predictability as being of great moment: 
 
The effectiveness of law as a social instrument is seriously diminished when legal 
practitioners believe they cannot confidently advise what the law is or how it 
applies to diverse situations of everyday life or when the courts of justice are 
made effectively inaccessible by the cost of litigation.  When legal practitioners 
are unable to predict the outcome of cases with a high degree of probability, the 
choice of the litigants is to abandon or to compromise their claims or defences or 
                                               
41  Ibid, at 1202. 
42  Ibid. 
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to expose themselves to the great expense and unpredictable risks of litigation … 
The cost of those services is substantially increased when lawyers cannot give 
advice to their clients without the need to read numerous and lengthy academic 
articles and judgments … to find out what the law is.  The cost of those services is 
also substantially increased when trial lawyers have to make lengthy and complex 
arguments about what appellate courts have “decided” and what policies govern 
their cases.  Inevitably, some litigants must compromise or abandon what they 
believe to be just claims or defences and be left with a sense of grievance.  Many 
more litigants must question whether litigation is a rational course of action given 
the return for them after deducting the irrecoverable solicitor and client costs and 
taking into account the risks always inherent in litigation.43 
 
Nevertheless, he eschewed a so-called “bright line” demarcation of liability: 
 
Ideally, arguments about duty should take little time with need to refer to one or 
two cases only instead of the elaborate arguments now often heard, where many 
cases are cited and the argument takes days.  The needs of the litigant or potential 
litigant, the legal practitioner and the trial judge should guide the formulation of the 
applicable principles.  That does not mean, however, that the common law must 
adopt arbitrary “bright-light” rules for the sake of certainty at the expense of what 
most people including judges would regard as a desirable result.44 
 
The appropriate response according to McHugh J was that which he had first mooted extra-
curially.45  It is an approach which involves an assessment of whether there are good 
reasons for the law to increment from existing categories of duty to impose a duty of care 
in the instant case.  The approach may be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Does the case come within an established category?  If yes, a duty is owed. 
                                               
43  Ibid. 
44  Ibid, at 1205. 
45  M McHugh, “Neighbourhood, Proximity and Reliance” in PD Finn (ed), Essays on 
Torts (Sydney: Law Book Co, 1989) 
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2. If the answer to the first question is no, was the harm which the plaintiff suffered a 
reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant’s acts or omissions?  If not, no duty 
is owed. 
3. If the answer to the second question is yes, the court should examine analogous 
cases where the courts have held that a duty does or does not exist to decide 
whether the law should be developed incrementally, by reference to the reasons or 
policy grounds why the material facts in analogous cases did or did not found a 
duty and by reference to the few principles of general application that can be found 
in the duty cases.46 
 
The incremental approach is nothing new.  Indeed it has long been the way of the common 
law.  One commentator once eloquently explained the approach in terms of “the judges 
preferring to go from case to case like the ancient Mediterranean mariners hugging the 
coast from point to point and avoiding the dangers of the open sea of system or science.”47  
Such an approach supplied the requisite degree of predictability for practitioners, trial 
judges and litigants.48 
 
This claim did not belong to a recognised category of pure economic loss but the loss was 
reasonably foreseeable.  The relevant policy considerations that required consideration 
were the fear of indeterminacy, whether liability would amount to an unreasonable 
burden on the autonomy of individuals, the plaintiffs’ vulnerability to risk and the 
defendant’s knowledge of that risk. 
 
His Honour dismissed fear of indeterminate liability as a concern in the present case: 
 
 
It is not the size or number of claims that is decisive in determining whether 
potential liability is so indeterminate that no duty of care is owed.  Liability is 
indeterminate only when it cannot be realistically calculated.  In both the likely 
number of claims and the nature of them can be reasonably calculated, it cannot be 
                                               
46  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1206. 
47  Lord Wright, “The Study of Law” (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review 185 at 186. 
48  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1206. 
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said that in imposing a duty and the defendant will render that person liable “in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”49 
 
Accordingly, since the defendant knew or ought to have known that those farming potatoes 
for export within a 20 km radius of the seed experiment could be affected by it, it could not 
be said that any liability for the economic loss suffered by those persons was indeterminate.  
It was in relation to constructive knowledge that courts needed to take care that the “ripple 
effect” of economic loss did not spread too far.  For this reason, while the defendant should 
be liable to “first line” claimants, it would stretch determinacy too far to extend liability to 
“second line” and subsequent victims of loss.50 
 
In a free enterprise society, no one questions the right of the trader to increase its 
advertising or cut its prices even though that action is done with the intention of taking the 
market share of its rivals.
51
 The question then was whether the defendant’s pursuit of its 
commercial interests made the case one where it was under no duty of care because it was 
legitimately pursuing its own business interests.  The defendant was already under a duty to 
take steps to protect the owners of the property on which the seed experiment was being 
conducted against the consequences of bacterial wilt.  That being so the defendant’s 
autonomy and freedom of action were not relevantly impaired if it were held to owe the 
same duty to the plaintiffs.  The case would be one of extending liability for the same 
                                               
49  Ibid, at 1208.  “Indeterminacy” is not the same as a lack of proportionality, that is 
that liability would be out of proportion to the defendant’s fault: cf Caltex Oil 
(Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad” (1976) 136 CLR 529 at 551 per 
Gibbs CJ.  It is not clear that this concern represents a valid policy consideration,  
when it is borne in mind that courts do not hesitate to find a duty of care where an 
accident has caused extensive property damage or injury to many people: see 
(1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1209. 
50  Ibid.  Thus if McHugh J’s reckoning were applied, while potato growers within 
20 km who exported their crop to Western Australia would be regarded as “first 
line” victims and represent a determinate liability, it would seem that “second 
line” victims such as any transport operators who suffered loss as a consequence 
of having no produce to haul would represent an indeterminate liability. 
51  See also Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159 at 211 per McHugh J. 
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activity, not of creating a new liability of a different kind with respect to different 
conduct.52   
 
Moreover, a duty of care was warranted here due to the plaintiffs’ vulnerability and their 
inability to protect their interests.  Indeed, McHugh J supported vulnerability – and the 
extent to which the plaintiff is able to protect himself or herself, perhaps by obtaining 
contractual warranties53 – as the relevant criterion for determining whether a duty of care 
existed, in preference to previously supported concepts such as reliance and assumption of 
responsibility.  Reliance and assumption of responsibility are merely evidentiary indicators 
of vulnerability.  Thus the plaintiff may be especially vulnerable to the words and/or 
conduct of the defendant because he or she reasonably relied on the defendant.54 
 
The degree and the nature of vulnerability which are sufficient to found a duty of care will 
no doubt vary from category to category and from case to case.  The extent of control 
exercised by the defendant will be an important test for vulnerability.55   Here, at all times 
the defendant had control over the experiment and where it would occur.  The future of the 
plaintiff’s business was dependent on events some distance away from their property, of 
which they did not know and could not have avoided even if they had known.  The 
vulnerability of the plaintiff to a risk of such magnitude was therefore very great.  In 
addition the defendant knew both the risk to the growers of potatoes and the owners of land 
on which potatoes were grown and all the potential consequences for them.  In light of this 
knowledge and the vulnerability of the plaintiff, McHugh J considered the case for holding 
the defendant owed a duty to take reasonable care to protect the plaintiffs from economic 
loss was “overpowering.”56 
 
                                               
52  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1217. 
53  Ibid, at 1211. 
54  Ibid, at 1213. Cf the recognition of vulnerability in Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 
CLR 159 at 216 per McHugh J; Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd v Peat Marwick 
Hungerfords (1997) 188 CLR 241 at 263-264 per Toohey and Gaudron JJ;  
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid at 1217. 
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Hayne J took a similar stance to McHugh J in describing the search for a single unifying 
principle lying behind what may be described as a relationship of proximity as a search for 
something that could not be found.  He also suggested that the appropriate approach was to 
proceed incrementally, the law developing with explicit recognition being given to the 
factors that were considered important in deciding whether there was a duty to take care to 
avoid pure economic loss.57  Such explicit recognition made unnecessary epithets like “fair, 
just and reasonable.”  His Honour was therefore critical of the three-stage Caparo test: if 
the desire to avoid indeterminate liability and the concern not to establish a rule that would 
render “ordinary” business conduct tortious were the relevant concerns, then the criterion 
or criteria devised by the courts should address them directly rather than obscure their 
significance behind expressions such as “fair, just and reasonable.”58   
 
Hayne J was satisfied that neither of these concerns prevented recognition of a duty here.  
Indeterminacy could be dismissed because it possible for the defendant to identify precisely 
those who would be affected by bacterial wilt caused by its negligence.59  In relation to 
whether the liability was consistent with basic assumptions about the economy in which the 
conduct takes place, he thought that the question could be framed as follows: what would 
have been the position if the defendant had deliberately (rather than negligently) engaged in 
the relevant conduct?  If deliberate conduct would have been illegal or would have made 
the defendant tortiously liable to the plaintiffs (or some of them) then it was conduct that 
would fall outside the boundaries of acceptable commercial dealing.  If, on the other hand, 
deliberate conduct was neither unlawful nor tortious, why should the same kind of conduct 
engaged in carelessly rather than deliberately be tortious?  In this case Hayne J pointed out 
that the deliberate introduction of seed affected by bacterial wilt was prohibited by statute, 
which also prescribed a fine or imprisonment as punishment.  Accordingly, the defendant’s 
conduct was not conduct within the bounds of acceptable commercial behaviour. 
 
Hayne J saw the instant case as bearing considerable resemblances to Caltex Oil (Australia) 
Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad.”  Here as there the defendant had knowledge of the 
                                               
57  Ibid, at 1256. 
58  Ibid. 
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plaintiffs as particular persons and not merely as members of an unascertained class.  The 
defendant therefore owed a duty to some of the plaintiffs to take care not to cause them 
economic loss. 
 
3.5 Incremental/compendious approach (Callinan J) 
 
Callinan J saw the area of pure economic loss as one in which the law was developing in a 
somewhat piecemeal fashion, as Stephen J predicted in Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The 
Dredge “Willemstad”.60  He accepted that it was “an area of the law in which the courts 
should move incrementally and very cautiously indeed”61 and that determination of a claim 
for pure economic loss was not a merely discretionary matter but instead required the 
application of a principle stated in Caltex Oil and subsequent cases. 
 
In doing so, his Honour sought to identify: 
 
The factors which in combination I think relevant in this case and which establish a 
sufficient degree of proximity, foreseeability, a special relationship, determinacy of 
a relatively small class, a large measure of control on the part of the respondent and 
special circumstances justifying the compensation of the appellants for their 
losses.62   
 
The factors his Honour listed as relevant were as follows: 
 
 the defendant played a leading role and commanding position in the industry.  This 
of itself tended to place the defendant in a special relationship with growers and 
handlers of potatoes; 
 the defendant was in effective control of the particular operation which lead 
ultimately to the imposition of the embargo upon the plaintiffs’ properties; 
                                                                                                                                            
59  Ibid, at 1256-1257. 
60  (1976) 136 CLR 529 at 576. 
61  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1269. 
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 the plaintiffs were members of a determinant class.  As indicated in an internal 
memorandum, the defendant actually foresaw as being within a class of people 
likely to be adversely affected, packers and processors of potatoes including those 
who were also growers, or handlers and land owners or facility owners closely 
connected with them such as those plaintiffs as were not growers; 
 there was geographical propinquity between the relevant properties;63 
 there was also commercial propinquity in as much as the plaintiffs and the 
defendant were both involved in the same industry in the same year and had been so 
involved for some time; 
 the defendant had an especially heightened awareness of the dangers of bacterial 
wilt and the strict attitude of the West Australian authorities towards the disease; 
 in this case the defendant assumed a risk of which it was well aware or should have 
been aware; 
 the harm that was done to the plaintiffs was done in relation to their participation in 
a national commodity market.  It was notorious that commodity markets are fragile 
and in particular are very vulnerable in modern times to contamination both 
prospective and actual; 
 the defendant was undertaking an experiment and experiments almost always 
involves risks, some of which the defendant’s own officers were stressing in 
writing; 
 the plaintiffs were rendered powerless to abate, or to prevent the occurrence of the 
loss to which they were subjected.  In no way did they act illegally, improperly or 
unreasonably or without regard for their own interests; 
 the plaintiffs were entitled to assume that those who were involved in and played a 
leading role in their industry and who might distribute or arrange for the use of seed 
which if infected could damage the plaintiffs’ business and properties would be 
responsible in the way in which they distributed or permitted a particular seed to be 
sown; 
                                                                                                                                            
62  Ibid, at 1269-1270. 
63  Cf Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad” (1976) 136 CLR 
529 at 597-598 per Jacobs J. 
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 what happened to the plaintiffs here was not the result of merely legitimate, 
competitive commercial activity; 
 the likely number of growers at risk actually or potentially as a result of the 
defendants’ activities was not so numerous as to be likely to give rise to a crippling 
burden upon the defendant.  In a country such as Australia it was open for a court to 
take judicial notice of the likelihood that generally speaking the cultivation of 
potatoes is not a market garden activity but would usually be a broadacre activity 
not involving a very large number of growers, especially growers exporting to 
Western Australia, and in an area within a radius of 20 km from the infected 
property; 
 the imposition of liability upon the defendant would not impose an impediment in 
the way of ordinary commercial activity in the potato industry; 
 what the defendant did went considerably beyond careless inadvertence and was the 
result of conscious decisions carrying with them obvious risks; 
 while what happened to the properties (the lands, the plant and equipment, and the 
leaseholds or tenancies) and the plaintiffs here may not have been actual physical 
damage it was closely analogous in terms of its effect; 
 to grant the plaintiffs relief in this case would not undermine any principle of law or 
liability which might otherwise be invoked; and  
 to hold this defendant liable represents no departure from previous case law.   
 
While some of these factors related directly to particular issues highlighted by Callinan J 
(such as the third factor showing the determinacy of the class of claimant), it would seem 
that others were not intended to be so restricted, leading to a “compendious” approach in 
which all the relevant issues were in one way or another covered by the combination of 
different factors. 
 
4. Messages for those at the coal face 
 
It may be that the different approaches to the determination of a duty of care are capable of 
being reduced into essentially four broad approaches: 
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 An incremental approach.  Although there are variations on this theme, an 
incremental approach seems to lie at the heart of the judgments of three judges, 
McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ.  The incremental approach is the way of the 
common law: a cautious approach which develops through argument by analogy 
from recognised cases.  Recent High Court cases demonstrate an openness in 
undertaking the balancing of competing policy considerations that are relevant to 
the case in hand.  The main criticisms of the approach are that recognition of duty in 
a particular case may involve an aspect of historical fortitude in the sense of 
depending on whether the cases had progressed sufficiently to allow the law to 
make the necessary increment, and the possible issue that what may seem a small 
step to one court may seem a giant leap to another. 
 Legally recognised rights.  Gaudron J has championed an approach which 
recognises a new category of pure economic loss where there is an impairment of a 
legally recognised right.  Her Honour saw this as the principled explanation of the 
existence of a duty of care in a series of cases such as Hawkins v Clayton, Bennett v 
Minister of Community Welfare and Hill v Van Erp.  The main criticism of the 
approach, as identified by McHugh J, lies in defining “legally recognised rights” in 
a way that will not mandate a massive expansion in liability. 
 The protected interests -“salient features” approach.  The approach favoured by 
Gleeson CJ and Gummow J is to first identify whether the plaintiff has a protected 
interest and then to identify the salient features of the case which warrant the 
finding of duty.  They expressly eschewed an incremental approach due to its so-
called “temporal defect” and suggest that the emergence of a coherent body of 
precedents based on “salient features” will be impeded, rather than assisted, by the 
imposition of a fixed system of categories in which damages in negligence for 
economic loss may be recovered.  The approach has the advantage of taking 
account of both the plaintiff and defendant in the duty equation, in contrast to the 
traditional focus on only the defendant’s conduct and foreseeability.  A similar 
point may be made in relation to Gaudron J’s approach, although the notion of a 
“legally protected interest” seems more easily defensible that a “legally recognised 
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right.”   A criticism may be whether in divorcing itself from incrementalism and 
argument by analogy, the approach will enable a sufficient degree of predictability 
for trial judges, legal advisers and litigants. 
 The three-stage Caparo approach.  Kirby J has advocated this approach as 
providing a methodology that may be applied in determining a duty of care in all 
cases.  It involves the court in addressing three questions: was the loss reasonably 
foreseeable, was there a relationship of proximity between the parties and is it “fair, 
just and reasonable” to impose a duty of care.  The approach has been criticised by 
McHugh and Hayne JJ on the basis that the second and third stages are merely 
labels or expressions of conclusions, lacking the content which is required for tests 
which may be of use to trial judges, legal advisers and litigants.  McHugh J was 
also concerned that the approach may be interpreted as meaning that established 
categories of case may be re-opened.  Kirby J has countered the first such criticism 
by suggesting that the usefulness of the approach depends upon the level of 
abstraction with which it is viewed and that the value of the approach lay in 
directing a court’s mind to the necessary questions that demanded attention. 
 
Just as there was a divergence in approaches to determining duty, there were differing 
views regarding the relevant factors that in addition to reasonable foreseeability helped to 
constitute a duty of care at least in cases of pure economic loss resulting from a physical 
act.    Nevertheless, some trends might be seen as emerging: 
 
 six of the judges (Gleeson CJ and Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and 
Callinan JJ) emphasised the plaintiff’s vulnerability.  The term “vulnerability” was 
expressly used by Gleeson CJ and McHugh and Kirby JJ,64 while Gaudron J 
referred to the plaintiff’s “dependence,”65 Gummow J said the plaintiffs had “no 
                                               
64  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1193 per Gleeson CJ, 1213 per McHugh J, 1248 per 
Kirby J. 
65  Ibid, at 1197. 
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avenue to protect themselves”66 and Callinan J described the plaintiffs as 
“powerless.”67 
 five of the judges (Gleeson C J and Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ) 
identified the defendant’s control as a significant factor,68 although McHugh J 
regarded control as merely an aspect of vulnerability;  
 five of the judges (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ) saw the 
plaintiff’s knowledge as a relevant factor in one way or another.  Gleeson CJ and 
Hayne J spoke in terms of knowledge of an ascertained class,69 Kirby J referred to 
the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiffs’ vulnerability,70 McHugh J stated that 
the defendant knew of the risk to those in the position of the plaintiffs,71 while 
Callinan J noted that the defendant was aware of the risk it assumed;72 and 
 three of the judges (Gleeson CJ and Kirby and Callinan JJ) echoed the view of 
Jacobs J in Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad” in regarding 
the physical propinquity between the parties helped to constitute the duty.73  Indeed 
Callinan J extended the notion to include “commercial propinquity” in the sense of 
the parties being involved in the same industry in the same year and having been so 
involved for a lengthy period of time.74 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The judgments in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd show that the search for a single approach to 
determining the existence of duty may be a long one.75  Past cases have shown that each 
time a unifying theory has been proposed, it has prospered for only a limited time before 
                                               
66  Ibid, at 1231. 
67  Ibid, at 1271. 
68  Ibid, at 1193 per Gleeson J, 1197 per Gaudron J, 1213 per McHugh J, 1230 per 
Gummow J, 1270 per Callinan J. 
69  Ibid, at 1193 per Gleeson CJ, 1257 per Hayne J. 
70  Ibid, at 1248. 
71  Ibid, at 1217. 
72  Ibid, at 1270. 
73  Ibid, at 1193 per Gleeson J, 1248 per Kirby J, 1270 per Callinan J. 
74  Ibid, at 1270. 
75  Ibid, at 1202 per McHugh J. 
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being discarded.  It may be that, as Hayne J suggested, the search is for something that is 
not to be found.76  Alternatively, it may be that the only approach of universal application 
exists at such a level of abstraction as to draw the criticism that it lacks the content 
necessary to be of use to those involved in resolving real life cases.77  If Perre v Apand Pty 
Ltd presented an opportunity to clarify the law, it was an opportunity whose potential was 
not realised. 
 
However, while the judgments were divided on the appropriate general approach to the 
duty question, there was greater agreement concerning the particular factors or features 
which represented the basis of the duty in the case at hand.  Generally speaking, the factors 
supported were vulnerability on the part of the plaintiff, and control and/or knowledge on 
the part of the defendant.  The emergence of these factors in this and other recent cases 
such as  Hill v Van Erp may itself have potential.  For example, McHugh J saw reliance 
and assumption of responsibility – previously regarded as the relevant factors in a case of, 
for example, negligent misstatement – as merely evidentiary indicators of the plaintiff’s 
vulnerability to harm from the defendant’s conduct.  In other words, the plaintiff is 
specially vulnerable to the words and/or conduct of the defendant because he or she 
reasonably relied on the defendant.78  He also suggested the concept of control was simply 
another way of saying that the plaintiff is vulnerable because the defendant controls the 
situation.79   
 
If that is so, the plaintiff’s vulnerability may emerge as a common thread running through 
liability for pure economic loss – whether it be loss from negligent misstatements, loss 
from negligent performance of a service such as was considered in Hill v Van Erp, or loss 
resulting from a physical act such as was considered in Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The 
                                               
76  Ibid, at 1255. 
77  See the three-stage test supported by Kirby J but criticised by McHugh and Hayne 
JJ. 
78  (1999) 73 ALJR 1190 at 1213.  Gleeson CJ also viewed reliance as an aspect of 
vulnerability: see ibid at 1193. 
79  Ibid, at 1213. 
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Dredge Willemstad and Perre v Apand Pty Ltd.80  This would provide at least some 
measure of clarity for those at the coalface, even if the overarching framework in which 
vulnerability properly operates may remain unclear.  
                                               
80  See also Gleeson CJ at 1193: “vulnerability can arise from circumstances other 
than reliance,” such as the vulnerability of the specific plaintiff in Caltex Oil 
(Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad”. 
